Of late we’ve all read about flattening the curve
of the pandemic; spreading out the burden of patients on the NHS by delaying
infections, so that its limited capacity is not overwhelmed by all the severe
illness happening at once. The idea is to go from this:
To this:
This
is a salient example of something that matters a lot, which is the fragility of
systems. Typically when we create something, whether a company, a machine, a
committee etc., we think of it as having a steady capacity, like the flat
dotted line in the first picture for NHS capacity. The NHS had a certain number
of intensive care beds and ventilators, and that’s what it can manage. The same
applies to a company: it has staff employed for 40 hours a week, and we assume
that those 40 hours are steady and identical, so the company has some multiple
of 40 person-hours a week to use.
As
has been explained in hundreds of articles over the last few months, disease
does not follow this pattern. Some problems have a reasonably steady rate of
incidence, but infectious disease ebbs and flows. We are accustomed to the flu
season every winter, which increases demand for ventilators, as vulnerable
people need help to overcome the virus before summer rolls round and people
stop crowding together indoors.
So
what capacity should the NHS have: level 1, level 5 or somewhere in between?
All capacity costs money, so we can’t just pick the most capacity without
suffering elsewhere. After all, that money could be spent on something else:
tax cuts for the lobbyists, maybe, or other NHS treatments. If we have enough
capacity to cope with the highest peak seen, or to cope with a potential higher
peak, then over half of our capacity will, on average, be unused.
Empty
operating theatres, empty hospital beds… these are prime fodder for angry
tabloid stories bemoaning government waste and bad health management. Why have
we wasted money on stuff we’re not using when we’re not funding expensive
cancer treatments for this one person we dug up?
That,
like most tabloid arguments, is utterly stupid. It could easily be that those
beds, despite being empty some of the time, still save more lives than the
equivalent price of an overpriced and oversold cancer drug. Tabloids never even
attempt to consider that; they are oblivious to the variability in demand.
While I’m on a little aside, that’s one reason why government programmes are
often so expensive: they are, by their nature, universal. They need to reach
everyone, and serve everyone. If some people are hard to access, difficult to
deal with, or all need help all at once, then the whole point of government intervention
is to be there in those difficult times. The private sector can serve the
easiest, most profitable people, and actually does best by excluding difficult
cases, as they reduce the average profit. Homogeneity is profitable… a point we
might come back to.
Anyway,
I think we can all guess that we don’t have capacity at levels 1 or 2. We’ve
gone through so many cost-cutting drives to find efficiencies, and 10 years of
underfunding, that I’d not be surprised if we were lower than level 4. We don’t
even have enough capacity for lowest levels of peak demand. This is the world
we live in: we are making hard decisions about allowing some people to die in
order to save money. Covid-19 has not suddenly created a situation in which need
outstrips capacity; it has merely created a worse one than normal. If I haven’t
been clear enough, we have already been letting people die in the name of
efficiency. This is normal and necessary.
Another
aside: yes, I do mean necessary. The nature of healthcare is that there is
always more that we can do. I do think that we should be doing an awful lot
more, but even I recognise that some things that could conceivably be justified
as healthcare are too expensive or disruptive to be worth it. So there will
always be a balance between saving some health and allowing people to truly live.
The
immediate point is that the NHS had had capacity cut until it was already
overburdened, because that ensures the most efficient use of assets by one
measure of efficiency. If operating theatres are always in use; beds never
unoccupied; doctors’ time always filled (to the extent that many are working
double hours), then it necessarily follows that sometimes there will be unmet
need and people will die. They won’t always die from famous, newsworthy
diseases like a new global pandemic. They will be elderly or infirm people who
just got unlucky. They got the flu or had a fall at the wrong time. Or maybe,
like my mother, had a stroke and couldn’t keep a bed on the stroke ward with
proper rehabilitation and physiotherapy because there were too many strokes,
and so after recovering then got dumped on sedatives instead and died without ever
really waking up again. At 63 years old.
God
forbid that we have enough stroke beds, and sometimes have them empty, with
nurses and physiotherapists having an extra half hour a day to rest or devote
to fewer patients.
One
more general point we can see from this example: fragility. I think that there’s
more to fragility than simply gradually going over capacity. Fragility is about
a system breaking; there are set points beyond which things don’t just get that
little bit worse, but a whole lot worse. If you bend a twig, it gradually
flexes out of shape, but at some point it’s under so much strain that when you
bend it more it snaps. It’s important to be aware of fragility, identify it,
expect it and prevent it.
All
systems need spare capacity. In my kitchen, for example, I need work surface to
do my chopping, mixing etc., and to put newly dirtied pots and bowls. If there
isn’t enough work surface, I have to spend a fair amount of time shifting
things around just to get, say, the chopping board next to the bowl I want to
put the chopped stuff in. And if, as in one shared house I lived in, all the
surfaces are used as storage, it suddenly becomes impossible to cook at all.
The free space that my housemates regarded as fair game for dumping cereal
packets on was actually better empty.
In
the NHS, empty beds or operating theatre slots are important. Emergencies can
crop up, and a spare slot allows managers to rearrange everything. That’s why
in those little sliding
piece puzzles one slot is empty: you need to be able to move a piece somewhere
empty in order to free up its space. If, in the name of efficiency, you fill that
slot, but the pieces need to be rearranged, you’re stuck. You’ve broken the system.
And if you need to get things in place fast, you might be best off with two free
spaces; that makes the puzzles much easier, whether it’s a child’s game or organisational
management.
Systems
aren’t often like the picture below:
Fragility
doesn’t just come from inflexibility. There are all sorts of negative feedbacks
that might emerge. If, for example, patients start to clog hospital corridors,
staff might be less able to get to where they need to be, losing time on the
patients they actually had time to book in. Or those extra patients will
transmit disease faster to everyone than they would if in a ward space. Without
flexibility, a delay somewhere, which becomes very likely, will lead to
complete cancellations elsewhere, because staff or equipment suddenly aren’t
available…
That
means that systems behave more like this:
So,
having explained how we’ve been killing people for years, what more important
things can we apply the same concept to? Fragility
is a broad concept that doesn’t just apply to life-saving work in healthcare,
but to everything. Before we get to the economy, let’s start with games
When
you play a game with your family, you’re typically faced with risky or less
risky choices. Monopoly, for all its flaws as a game, is widely known, so let’s
think about that. Should you buy another house on your set or keep a bigger
cushion of money in case you land on someone else’s? If you keep a massive
financial cushion you’ll never get enough income from your under-improved properties and you’re
guaranteed to lose eventually, but if you aim for a high income as soon as
possible, and you spend all your cash on houses, then you’ll need to be lucky not to lose quickly. Ideally, with
just your family playing, you judge your risks based on everyone else’s
success: if someone else gets lucky, you need to spend your cushion to try to keep up, and take your chances now when they're better. With, say, 4 players, that can still lead to
a game that lasts a while, although it’s very likely that someone gets unlucky
early on and has to find something else to do.
The
same applies in any game. If you play pontoon (also called blackjack, or 21, or
vingt-et-un…) you want to beat just one person, the dealer. That’s why the
dealer should play quite safe; if he goes bust then everyone else knows they
can just stick with what they’ve got and still win. But imagine you’re playing
against everyone else. It’s really likely that someone out there will have a
20, even if there’s no obvious 5-card trick or 21. Playing it safe will just
lose you your stake. You have to take a big risk to win.
This
is our capitalist market. You are in competition with everyone. In theory, the number
of competitors can be modelled as infinite. That’s ‘ideal’. If you play it
safe and hold something back for a rainy day, someone else will start up, cut that cost and sell things more cheaply at
the same quality (not that quality is much of a signal in modern markets). That
person will get all the customers; or else that person will sell at the same
price but make more profit, and therefore get all the investors. Either way, your
investment in resilience is wasted.
The
key to our current economy is competition (call it capitalism, neoliberalism,
just plain badly-run or badly-regulated, or whatever you please; let’s save the
argument about terminology for someone else). It’s about competition right now,
for profits right now. That means cutting as many corners as possible to grab
whatever share of the market you can right now: the future is too expensive to
worry about.
There
are all sorts of theoretical answers to this counterproductive set of
incentives. You might hope that investors have perfect information and
therefore know which companies are more resilient, and therefore also know that
those companies offer better long-term prospects. But perfect information is
one of the theoretical assumptions that we’re furthest from. Even in the
information age, people are more snowed under a weight of misinformation (also
called PR or marketing) than they are well-informed.
You
might hope that the barriers to entry and obvious market volatility lead all
the cut-throat market entrants to be less risk-taking with their businesses. But
there will always be risk-takers hoping to survive through luck rather than
good planning, and therefore make a big profit.We have no shortage of desperate people trying to come good with yet another throw of the dice.
And
so we are likely to have repeated new entrants starting up, making profits in
the good times, and going broke in the bad times. And if new entrants are providing
that competition, big, established companies must follow the same strategy or
lose out. And that’s how we get big banks, ‘too big to fail’ taking massive risks
and in the financial crisis easily becoming insolvent. The market system we
have set up pushes all companies to as close to breaking as they can go in a
desperate attempt to keep up.
In
a racing analogy, with only one race, that makes sense. If you’re thinking of a
predator and prey, a nice macho analogy, the prey must run faster, no matter
what the potential cost. But as soon as you think longer than one event, it
doesn’t make sense. If you push your car, or horse, or yourself, far too hard
in the first of many races, you’ll likely have an injury or breakdown and do
far worse. That’s fragility. Horses are actually a great example. They have evolved to be running machines; creatures that big shouldn't be as fast. But that has come at a cost. They easily break their legs, which have no excess weight, and therefore strength. In the wild, that's just collateral damage of their evolved survival strategy. But the same fragility in society equates to human suffering.
We
choose to set up a system which forces this desperation and makes it difficult
to invest for the future. That’s how our markets work, with instant stock
trading, and a focus on share price by senior executives, whose reputations are
determined by stock performance now, even if their stock options mature in the
future.
Yet,
just as with infectious disease, markets are volatile. Demand varies, by season
and economic cycle as well as consumer whim. We must therefore expect, as part
of our economic system, an endless cycle of bankruptcies, failures and job
losses, with only the lucky surviving for any length of time until they become
famous enough and respected, or have enough reach and digital information, that
they have a massive advantage over new entrants. They can then afford a little
safety; in fact, once established, their advantage can be so great that we get
a whole load of other market failures, from disinformation (‘marketing’)
through to lobbying and regulatory capture.
The
essential point is that everyone sensible must take those chances, and
therefore be lucky. And those few who are successful owe it more to luck than
taking the best chances. If I give myself a 2% chance of winning and 196 others
are incompetent enough to share the remaining 98% at 0.5% each, I still owe a
lot more to luck than to skill if I win. That's true even though I'm four times better than any other rival. In the same example, whichever 196 of us lose, all will
still owe their situation more to the system that forced us into taking those chances
than their own incompetence.
In
short, capitalism builds fragile systems: it is intrinsic to the way we run it.
And when big companies fail, we have seen what happens: public bail-outs. So in
the end, we all pay for this disaster of a system, while those who have been lucky
enough to have enough to invest, and crucially, enough to pay for lobbyists,
end up winning in the good times and not losing in the bad. There are even ways to make money from the bad times, if you have enough to invest in the first place, and enough to spread your risk widely.
That’s
what has happened to privatised services. I don’t know much about our railways,
but I have seen enough of the arguments train drivers have had with management
to cast that argument as one about fragility: guardless trains, staffed only by
the driver, are a safety risk. It’s not that a train can’t be operated only by
the driver, if everything works well. But people do get stuck in doors, disabled
people need help with wheelchairs, and so on. Much of the time, perhaps, a
conductor is not required, but without one the train can be delayed, and then
it might miss its slot on a packed trainline which has no spare capacity itself…
The problem is obvious.
There
are other criticisms of privatisation, but this is not the place.
We do have an industry which has dealt with fragility,
and that is electricity production. A functional National Grid is really a wonder
of the modern world. The electricity is on all the time, even though daily
demand varies enormously (although reasonably predictably, which does make
things a bit easier). How do generators balance supply with demand? Through a
whole company (National Grid has been privatised) and over 16,000 pages of
dense legal obligations on top of normal laws and regulations.
If
you’re tempted to take it for granted, look at some other countries to see the
results. I have a friend in Zambia who is plagued by what they know as ‘load-shedding’;
rolling, unpredictable blackouts that can happen as much as every day for
hours, because electricity supply and demand are not matched (and oversupply is
dangerous too, as it can blow fuses or equipment).
Just
a little change can short-circuit the whole system. We ensure that suppliers always
supply through definitive legal obligations and considerable amounts of government
subsidy, planning and intervention. One could argue that some of this is
unnecessary, but without some form of payment for availability as well as for
electricity, we would not be able to match demand to supply. Availability is a
commodity that has value.
Except,
of course, when it doesn’t. And that’s when it’s individuals’ availability. Low
wage workers are not typically paid to enter zero-hours contracts.
It’s a default for
workers to work between 9 and 5 (or in many jobs nowadays, 8.30 and 6 or longer….).
It doesn’t matter if they’re a bit ill and would benefit from a lie-in or a
shorter day; the world of work, including office work that isn’t shift-based
(when the timing is important, for overseeing machinery or serving customers),
demands that people work set hours. But individuals do not have a steady
capacity for work. Illness, life events, home trouble, a neighbour’s party: a
vast range of things can make the cost of 9-5 on one day feel like more than on
another. Presenteeism encourages workers to turn up even if they feel less than
100%, instead of doing work when best able to. And if it’s a demanding job,
then it requires that they do the additional work of managing the timing of
their capacity. No late dinners with friends: work must start at 9, not 10
tomorrow. No social life. Got ill? Well, tough luck. Take some drugs and hope
the stimulants mask the fact that you should be resting more than usual.
We treat workers as
substitutable components; Lego bricks all the same size and purpose in any role.
Workers aren’t automata who can perform at (the same) 100% for precise,
unbending periods of time. They have more or less capacity at different times
and ideally each individual life would have flexibility to do more at some
times at less at others. If we require people to operate at peak capacity all
the time, at the same times, we can expect the system (their life) to break
down.
And by require, I
include demands of career advancement and promotion. If we reward dedication
then we will end up rewarding those with the free time to dedicate to work.
Those who can spare most capacity for work will do best, and those burdened
with care, housework, poverty and budgeting constraints, illness or just
hobbies and creative interests will all lose out, and everyone will end up, as
happens with companies, putting in as much time as they can in order to avoid
falling behind and trusting to luck that life doesn’t unravel. There will be no
free time for creativity; no spare capacity for events. Spare capacity is a
source of social shame: what are you doing with your time? Why are you wasting it?
And at the same time as our culture demands you give all your time, researchers
are finding that having too much to deal with reduces your performance at
everything. This is most obvious with the poor and unfortunate: even when they have
time for something, the stress of the rest of their lives, and the intrusive
worries about all their other problems, reduce their performance. They have
gone past their capacity and negative feedback has begun to demonstrate fragility
in their enforced lifestyle.
And then we discuss
burnout and mid-life crises. By the time burnt-out people have hustled their
way to depression they’ve already trodden others down. The people who knew that
they wanted a good work-life balance all along have been elbowed out of the way
by those who used their spare capacity and were fortunate enough not to need it
for anything else… but now find it might have been nice to have it for
something else. Everyone has lost, even those who had it right all along.
Spare capacity should
be a point of pride and thankfulness.
The flip side of a set
40-hour week is that employers frequently expect office staff to work longer
hours at peak times. As we can see in the electricity market, that sort of
extra capacity is hugely valuable when we (the people) buy it, but it has
become a hidden expectation that we (the people) don’t get paid for when giving
it away.
There’s a reason that
contractors and consultants charge a lot, and it’s not always just their
over-inflated brand value. They allow flexibility: they are a whole segment of
the economy that exists to provide flexibility in capacity for organisations. The
downside is the overheads of contract management, performance monitoring and
lack of trust; or lack contractual flexibility in outsourcing.
The drive for leanness
in systems comes from a lack of trust. Managers don’t know when they’re being
taken advantage of… and are driven to take as much as they can from employees.
Cut things away and see if anything breaks would be a good idea if only effects
were immediate and stresses constant. There is wisdom in the old design maxim
that you achieve perfection not when there is nothing left to add, but nothing
left to take away (yes, if I spent more time on writing, I could apply that here).
But wisdom only. You need to know what actually could be taken away.
My father always used
to like the solid, real-world example of a bridge. 97% on a test isn’t good
enough: a 97% survival rate when crossing your bridge isn’t good enough. The
same applies here. You can save some materials and still have a bridge stand up
when you first build it, but if it collapses when the first storm wind blows,
you haven’t been clever. And maybe it’s more expensive to put emergency
supports up every time the wind blows…
What is leanness? It
used to mean just being thin: the opposite of fat. And we get fat for a reason:
to survive hard times. Weightlifters go through bulk and cut phases because
they can’t grow quickly without also getting a bit fat: fat is an intrinsic part of
growing strong, and is not just waste. Obesity is unhealthy, but a human with
no fat is seriously ill. The same applies to organisations and systems. The
clue is right there in the words that modern management jargon uses. We should
learn from Mother Nature: in volatile times, spare capacity matters.
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